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Abstract: Our study of the implementation of the 
2012 presidential “May Decrees” in Russia’s regions 
shows that, even though the political system is highly 
centralized and authoritarian, the administrative capacity 
of the state is low and there are wide variations in the 
execution of the decrees across the Federation. One 
important factor that has negatively impacted state 
capacity is the weakness of formal institutions and 
the dominance of informal over formal politics. The 
personal ties of regional governors to policymakers at 
the center and their administrative competence, coupled 
with the level of cohesion of the regional elite, are the 
most important determinants of the state’s subnational 
capacity.
In this study, we examine variations in the levels of subnational state capacity in the Russian Federation. Our focus is the “May Decrees” 
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 that were adopted by President Putin on May 7, 2012. The package of 11 decrees covered a wide range of issues: “demographic policy; foreign 
policy; armed forces; military service; inter-ethnic relations; state admin-
istration; affordable housing; education and science; health care; social 
policy; and long-term economic policy.”1 As Remington notes, the decrees, 
which were broken down into 2,018 specific assignments, “specified 
ambitious goals for the government, including concrete target dates for 
the accomplishment of particular tasks.”2 According to government esti-
mates, implementation of the decrees over the period 2013-15 would cost 
1 trillion rubles, while achieving the full range of targets would cost 3-4% 
of GDP.3 
The research questions posed in this article are whether the high 
political centralization that is clearly present in Russia also ensures a 
high level of administrative state capacity and what factors are the most 
important for a high level of administrative capacity across the regions. In 
this paper, we rely on the research guidelines of institutional economics, as 
we study an economic phenomenon that is heavily influenced by political 
and social institutions. As North states, “the theoretical framework should 
be capable of integrating neo-classical theory with an analysis of the way 
institutions modify the choice set available to human beings.”4 
In recent years, scholars have turned their attention to the role of state 
capacity in boosting the resilience of authoritarian regimes. As Soifer and 
vom Hau note, “High-capacity states are seen, as generally better equipped 
to establish a monopoly of violence, enforce contracts, control their popu-
lace, regulate institutions, extract resources, and provide public goods.”5 
Likewise, for Andersen et al., a state’s capacity “to penetrate society, regu-
late social relations, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in 
determined ways, stabilizes both authoritarian and democratic regimes.”6  
Literature Review: Defining State Capacity
Many studies of state capacity adopt a Weberian approach, focusing on 
the efficiency and autonomy of the state bureaucracy and its ability to 
“get things done.” Thus, according to Centeno, Kohli, and Yashar,7 state 
1 Thomas Remington. 2014. Presidential Decrees in Russia: A Comparative Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., 4.
4 Douglass C. North. 1986. “The New Institutional Economics.” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 142: 1: 230-237, 231.
5 Hillel Soifer and Matthias vom Hau. 2008. “Unpacking the Strength of the State: The 
Utility of State Infrastructural Power.” Studies in Comparative International Development 
43: 3: 219-230, 221.
6 David Andersen, Jørgen Møller, Lasse Lykke Rørbaek, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2014. 
“State Capacity and Political Regime Stability.” Democratization 21:  7: 1305-1325, 1306.
7 Miguel Angel Centeno, Atul Kohli, and Deborah J. Yashar. 2017. “Unpacking States in 
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capacity “involves the bureaucratic, managerial, and organizational ability 
to process information, implement policies, and maintain governing 
systems,” while Skocpol defines state capacity as the ability to “implement 
official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful 
social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstanc-
es.”8 For Migdal, capacities are defined as “the abilities of state leaders 
to use the agencies of the state to get the people in the society to do what 
they want them to do.”9 As Cingolani notes, these include “the capacities 
to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources and 
appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”10 More parsimoniously, 
Fukuyama defines state capacity simply as the “ability of states to plan 
and execute policies and enforce laws cleanly and transparently”11 and 
Croissant and Hellmann define it as “the ability of state institutions to 
implement official goals and policies.”12  
Summarizing the literature, Giraudy notes that a high-capacity state: 
“(a) penetrates evenly throughout the territory it claims to govern, regulate, 
and control; (b) exerts political power autonomously from non-state actors, 
and (c) relies on a professionalized, institutionally capable, and resourceful 
bureaucracy to carry out public policies, extract resources (taxes) from 
society, and deliver public goods, including the rule of law.”13
State capacity has also been studied from an international relations 
perspective, looking at a state’s level of sovereignty and its ability to 
both defend that sovereignty and advance its interests in the international 
arena. Thus, for example, Melville et. al. have attempted to assess the 
quality of statehood: “the level of real (as opposed to formal) sovereignty, 
independence and self-sufficiency, and the state’s ability to ensure the 
effective functioning and reproduction of political, economic, social, and 
other institutions.”14 They have also have developed an index of statehood, 
the Developing World: Capacity, Performance, and Politics.” In Miguel Angel Centeno, 
Atul Kohli, and Deborah J. Yashar, States in the Developing World. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 18.
8 Theda Skocpol 1985. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Re-
search.” In Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemayer, and Theda Skocpol, eds. Bringing the 
State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Quoted in L. Cingolani. 2013. “The 
State of State Capacity: A Review of Concepts, Evidence and Measures.” UNU-MERIT 
Working Papers 053 (October 10): 9.
9 Joel S. Migdal. 2001. State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and 
Constitute One Another. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, xiii.
10 Cingolani, “The State of State Capacity,” 7.
11 Francis Fukuyama. 2004. State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 7.
12 Aurel Croissant and Olli Hellmann. 2018. “Introduction: State Capacity and Elections in 
the Study of Authoritarian Regimes.” International Political Science Review 39: 1: 3–16, 9.
13 Agustina Giraudy. 2012. “Conceptualizing State Strength: Moving Beyond Strong and 
Weak States.” Revista de Ciencia Política 32: 3: 599–611, 602.
14 A. Iu. Melville, M. V.  Il’in, Iu. A. Polunin, M. G. Mironiuk, E. Yu. Meleshkina, and I. N. 
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which indicates “a state’s level of success, governability, capacity and 
effectiveness” and can “serve as a tool to determine its quality and potential 
for independent development.”15  
Many of the current studies on state capacity are based on the 
work of Mann, who defined two components of state capacity: despotic 
power, namely “the range of actions that the state elite is empowered to 
make without consultation with civil society groups;”16 and infrastructural 
power, or “the institutional capacity of a central state, despotic or not, to 
penetrate its territories and logistically implement decisions.”17 Building 
on this research, scholars have posited three key dimensions of state capac-
ity: (1) coercive capacity; (2) administrative capacity; and (3) extractive 
capacity.18 
Coercive capacity refers to the state’s ability “to maintain a monop-
oly over the legitimate use of force, including both the ability to maintain 
order within the borders of the state and to defend the territory against 
external threats.”19 Administrative capacity “involves the ability to design 
and implement policies throughout the territory, and regulate the social 
and economic sphere.”20 Finally, extractive capacity refers to the ability 
of the state to raise taxes and other revenue. As Fortin-Rittberger stresses, 
“The ability to collect taxes in a sustained and efficient manner can only 
be achieved when a state has effective control over a territory, since taxes 
are the product of political bargains between the state and different societal 
groups.”21 
Timofeev. 2007. Politicheskii Atlas Sovremennosti: Opyt Mnogomernogo Statisticheskogo 
Analiza Politicheskikh Sistem Sovremennykh Gosudarstv [Contemporary Political Atlas: 
Experience of Multidimensional Statistical Analysis of Political Systems of Modern States]. 
Мoscow: MGIMO University, 16 
15 Ibid., 71.
16 Michael Mann. 1986. The Sources of Social Power. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 59.
17 Ibid.
18 See Andersen, Møller, Rørbaek, and Skaaning, “State Capacity and Political Regime 
Stability”; Croissant and Hellmann, “Introduction: State Capacity and Elections in the Study 
of Authoritarian Regimes”; Jonathan K. Hanson and Rachel Sigman. 2011. “Leviathan’s 
Latent Dimensions: Measuring State Capacity for Comparative Political Research.” Paper 
presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Studies Association; Soifer and 
vom Hau, “Unpacking the Strength of the State”; David White. 2018. “State Capacity and 
Regime Resilience in Putin’s Russia.” International Political Science Review 39: 1: 130-143; 
David White and Marc Herzog. 2016. “Examining State Capacity in the Context of Electoral 
Authoritarianism, Regime Formation and Consolidation in Russia and Turkey.” Southeast 
European and Black Sea Studies 16: 4: 551-569.
19 Croissant and Hellmann, “Introduction: State Capacity and Elections in the Study of Au-
thoritarian Regimes,” 9.
20 Jonathan K. Hanson. 2018. “State Capacity and the Resilience of Electoral Authoritarian-
ism: Conceptualizing and Measuring the Institutional Underpinnings of Autocratic Power.” 
International Political Science Review 39: 1: 17–32, 20.
21 Jessica Fortin-Rittberger. 2014. “Exploring the Relationship between Infrastructural and 
Coercive State Capacity.” Democratization 21:  7: 1244–1264, 1248.
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Contemporary research also outlines several other types of state 
capacity. According to Kugler and Arbetman, the concept of “relative 
political capacity” “captures the ability of political systems to carry out 
the tasks chosen by the nation’s government in the face of domestic and 
international groups with competing priorities.”22 They emphasize that 
political capacity can be successfully enjoyed by undemocratic, non-free 
countries. Other forms of state capacity are “legal capacity”—”the capa-
bility of enforcing contracts and property rights (i.e., a judicial system for 
settling disputes, rule of law)”—and “military capacity,” which “refers to 
the state’s ability to deter or repel challenges to its authority with force, so 
facing issues of internal and external security.”23 
We would also like to stress the importance of legitimacy for regime 
stability. As Andersen et al. note, “whilst authoritarian systems are able to 
rely on coercion and repression to counteract less effective performance, 
in the long term they too are likely to be more stable if they are adminis-
tered effectively.”24 High levels of state capacity provide regimes with the 
ability to deliver public goods efficiently, which increases their stock of 
performance legitimacy. 
State Capacity: The Subnational Level
Although previous studies have advanced our knowledge of state capacity 
at the national level, there has to date been very little work on the regional 
dimension of state capacity. This is despite the fact that, as Soifer and vom 
Hau rightly stress, “the capabilities of the state vary subnationally: the state 
is not homogeneously powerful throughout the national territory; its reach 
is uneven over territory and over societal actors.”25 However, there is no 
obvious way to measure state capacity in subnational regions. It is possible 
to use the degree of the regions’ financial dependence on the center or the 
level of government debt (by analogy with the existing criteria for national 
state capacity), but these are only individual criteria that do not present the 
full picture. Moreover, analysis of subnational sovereignty is a problematic 
exercise in and of itself, since only federations and confederations are 
deemed to possess it in the first place. It would thus be more appropriate to 
interpret regional capacity as an equivalent to national capacity but factor 
in the limitations of control and resources at the subnational level. 
22 Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman. 2018. “Relative Political Capacity: Political Extraction 
and Political Reach.” In Jacek Kugler and Marina Arbetman, eds. Political Capacity and 
Economic Behavior. London: Routledge, 11-45, 12.
23 Antonio Savoia and Kunal Sen. 2015. “Measurement, Evolution, Determinants, and Con-
sequences of State Capacity: A Review of Recent Research.” Journal of Economic Surveys 
29: 3: 441-458, 443.
24 Andersen, Møller, Rørbaek, and Skaaning, “State Capacity and Political Regime Stability,” 
1308.
25 Soifer and vom Hau, “Unpacking the Strength of the State,” 222.
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Some scholars, such as Somuano and Nieto in their study of Mexican 
regions, differentiate between territories with strong and weak state capac-
ity.26 In order to measure and evaluate subnational capacity, the authors 
draw on expert interviews and interpret state capacity as the government’s 
ability to maintain social order. Such studies take subnational capacity as 
an independent variable and demonstrate how its level influences political 
participation, testing their hypotheses using regression models. They find 
that in instances of low subnational capacity, people tend more toward 
protest actions, whereas strong subnational capacity inclines them towards 
conventional forms of political participation such as elections and inter-
action with political representatives. In this study, we adopt a different 
approach, seeing subnational capacity as a dependent variable and seeking 
to clarify the key factors from which it is derived. From this perspective, 
subnational capacity is not seen merely as a reproduction of state capac-
ity at the regional level, but rather is analyzed in terms of national state 
capacity. To that end, we study the degree to which federal decisions are 
implemented (or even sabotaged or rejected) across the regions of the state. 
Administrative State Capacity in the Russian Federation 
In the current literature, subnational state capacity is seen either as the 
capacity of the state as a whole (but at the level of individual territories) 
or as the state’s administrative capacity to implement its policies across 
the whole country. Such an approach renders it either difficult or unnec-
essary to distinguish between the contributions of federal and regional 
governments to the functioning of state institutions within a given territory. 
Moreover, in federations with advanced levels of cooperation between 
the central and regional governments, such as Germany, or in centralized 
quasi-federations with a hierarchical structure of power, like Russia, 
this contribution cannot be separated and distinguished, even if we take 
into account the formal separation of powers between the center and the 
regions. 
In centralized or unitary systems, the regional government is treated 
as an agent of the central government, which allows scholars to approach 
the question from a different angle. Here, the focus is on not only the 
implementation of the decisions of the central government in the regions, 
but also the success of regional governments at implementing the center’s 
policies. For example, a case study of two Chinese provinces focused on 
subnational government capacity, which was defined as the capacity of 
the regional authorities to implement central directives.27 The study found 
26 Ma. Fernanda Somuano and Fernando Nieto. 2016. Ciudadanía en México: Ciudadanía 
activa? [The Citizenry in Mexico: An Active Citizenry?]. México DF: INE/Colmex.
27 Kyle Jaros. 2016. “Rethinking Subnational Government Capacity in China.” Journal of 
Chinese Governance 1: 4: 633–653.
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that the development of internal network structures within a region and 
the cohesion of its elite were important factors determining the strength of 
subnational capacity and a region’s level of local autonomy. In addition, it 
found that local-level state capacity is also determined by the ability of the 
regions to harness the resources and capabilities of the central government, 
which in many cases will depend on regions’ informal ties to political elites 
at the center. 
This approach to examining subnational government capacity in 
China would also seem to be applicable to Russia. In the Russian case, 
the internal cohesion of regions is associated with the construction of a 
hierarchical “vertical of power” between the regional government and 
its local administrations, as well as the nature of the regional elite and its 
consolidation, which may depend on the duration of a governor’s rule. The 
regions’ formal and informal ties with the center are also very important.
Turning to the subnational dimension of administrative capacity 
in Russia, we would stress the importance of informal politics and the 
influence of clientelism and patronage in the decision-making process.28 In 
addition, we need to take into account the negative impact of corruption—
which, as White stresses, “weakens state capacity through the siphoning of 
state resources” and “undermining public support in state institutions.”29 
In analyzing the Russian case, we are also reminded of the problem 
of the low efficiency of state institutions, which can lead to the poor imple-
mentation of the center’s policies even where centralization is most rigid.30 
Another obstacle to the implementation of political decisions in Russia is 
the low level of legal capacity, which, as international comparative studies 
show, can restrict economic growth and give rise to political unrest.31 In 
this respect, an analysis of the regional institutional environment—includ-
ing, for example, the problem of corruption—may be of interest.
Furthermore, researchers often look for connections between state 
capacity and the development of democracy. International studies indicate 
that there is a curvilinear (J-shaped) connection between democracy and 
state capacity, demonstrating the presence of a strong positive relationship 
only in countries with high levels of democracy, whereas at a low level 
of democracy such a relationship is negative, and at the medium level 
it is absent.32 There have been attempts to measure levels of democracy 
28 See Henry Hale. 2017. “Russian Patronal Politics Beyond Putin.” Daedalus. 146: 30–40; 
Geoffrey Hosking. 2000. “Patronage and the Russian State.” The Slavonic and East European 
Review 78: 2: 301–320. 
29 White and Herzog, “Examining State Capacity,” 562.
30 On the relationship between state capacity and the quality of institutions, see Andrei Mel-
ville and Mikhail Mironyuk. 2016. “‘Bad Enough Governance’: State Capacity and Quality 
of Institutions in Post-Soviet Autocracies.” Post-Soviet Affairs 32: 2: 132–151.
31 Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. 2010. “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development.” 
Econometrica 78: 1: 1-34.
32 Hanna Bäck and Axel Hadenius. 2008. “Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a 
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in the Russian regions, but these are now of much less value due to the 
widespread development of authoritarianism across the federation.33 
Nonetheless, under current conditions, the level of electoral competition 
in regional elections may correlate with state capacity, although it can be 
expected to have a negative influence on the latter, given the non-linear 
relationship between democracy and state capacity. 
There are also a number of studies that examine the relationship 
between the level of state capacity and the durability of electoral author-
itarianism. In particular, Hanson has written about the capabilities and 
mechanisms that electoral authoritarian regimes employ to maintain stabil-
ity.34 Seeberg  has observed that in authoritarian regimes with higher levels 
of state capacity, autocrats have more opportunities to manipulate voters 
and prevent protests.35 Meanwhile, van Ham and Seim note that in electoral 
authoritarian regimes with high levels of state capacity, there are lower 
chances of regime change via elections; however, such regime change 
brings a higher likelihood of democratic change than in the case of govern-
ments with low state capacity.36 These studies lead us to conclude that in 
electoral authoritarian regimes such as Russia’s, the level of state capacity 
has a significant impact on the regime’s ability to maintain stability. 
Methodology and Results: Assessing Administrative Capacity 
across the Russian Federation
In this section, we examine one dimension of state administrative capac-
ity, namely the implementation of the 2012 presidential May Decrees. In 
our opinion, the implementation of the May Decrees is a reliable indi-
cator of subnational administrative capacity, as it represents the regions’ 
response—or failure to respond adequately—to a series of direct instruc-
tions sent from the federal center. How well the regions complied with 
these guidelines reflects the extent to which the state can implement a 
unified policy throughout the country, which is the definition of adminis-
trative capacity.
We analyzed regional variations in the implementation of the 2012 
May Decrees up until the eve of the 2018 presidential elections (i.e., 
conditions at the end of 2017). We chose to focus on the presidential May 
Decrees because they received a huge amount of public attention and were 
seen as a nationwide task that had to be accomplished by the relevant 
J-Shaped Relationship.” Governance 21: 1–24. 
33 N. V. Petrov and A. S. Titkov. 2013. Reiting Demokratichnosti Regionov Moskovskovo 
Tsentra Karnegi: 10 let v stroiu [Carnegie Moscow Center Regional Democracy Rating: 10 
Years in the Making]. Moscow: Moskovskii Tsentr Karnegi. 
34 Hanson, “State Capacity and the Resilience of Electoral Authoritarianism.”
35 Merete Bech Seeberg. 2014. “State Capacity and the Paradox of Authoritarian Elections.” 
Democratization. 21: 7: 1265–1285.
36 Soifer and vom Hau, “Unpacking the Strength of the State.”
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regional authorities. This also allowed us to test the capabilities of the 
regions, taking into account their very different socio-economic conditions 
and the administrative competence of their governors. 
In our regression analysis, we employ an approach that utilizes a 
multitude of variables, as opposed to a minimalist approach. Since the 
implementation of the May Decrees potentially depends on many different 
independent factors, we include them in the analysis in order to understand 
which is the most important for effective implementation.
We calculated the number of decree-mandated tasks that were imple-
mented by the regions (these data are available from a special section of 
the Federal State Statistics Service, www.gks.ru).37 The May Decrees 
represent certain goals, expressed in numerical terms, that the regions 
must achieve by a certain date. In total, we analyzed 21 criteria, including 
both social and economic criteria, as well as the share of people accessing 
state and municipal services by digital means (all the criteria we study are 
described in Table 1). To evaluate each criterion, each goal of the May 
Decrees was compared with the region’s actual situation as of the end of 
2017 and coded as “1” (the goal has been met) or “0” (the goal has not been 
met). Data were available on 14 social criteria and 6 economic criteria, so 
the overall result for the degree of implementation is tilted in the direction 
of social criteria. 
In general, the level of implementation of the May Decrees in the 
regions can be considered low, which is to be expected given the lack of a 
concrete mechanism for reward and punishment. Another important factor 
was the practical problems faced by the regions in finding enough funds 
to execute the policies (which ultimately resulted in an accumulation of 
state debt). The situation was aggravated by the ongoing crises within 
the Russian economy, which were made even worse by the imposition of 
Western sanctions after 2014. 
According to our analysis, only a single region was able to satisfy 
more than 50% of the criteria, namely Tatarstan (11 of 21). Five more 
shared second place, with 10 satisfied criteria (the Lipetsk, Moscow,38 
and Nizhny Novgorod Oblasts, and the Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamalo-
Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrugs). Meanwhile, 26 regions met less than a 
quarter of the criteria. In the bottom spots were the Jewish Autonomous 
Oblast (only 2 criteria), Bryansk Oblast (3 criteria), and the Kursk, Ryazan, 
Tver, Pskov, Penza, and Irkutsk Oblasts, as well as the Adygea Republic 
(4 criteria).
37 Ofitsial’naia statisticheskaia informatsiia po pokazateliam, soderzhashchimsia v ukazakh 
Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ot 7 maia 2012 g. No. 596-606, v sootvetstvii s razdelom 2.6. 
Federal’nogo plana statisticheskikh rabot [Official Statistical Information on the Indicators 
Contained in the Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation of May 7, 2012, No. 596-
606, in Accordance with Section 2.6 of the Federal Statistical Work Plan], At https://www.
gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/rosstat/pok-monitor/inf-pok2019.htm, accessed May 30, 2020.
38 Moscow Oblast is not to be confused with the state’s capital, which it surrounds. 
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If we consider the regions’ performance on economic and social 
indicators separately, it is clear that this was much worse on the former, 
which points to the limitations created by economic and financial condi-
tions in the regions, which governors are simply unable to change. Indeed, 
over 50% of regions (46) were unable to satisfy a single criterion of 
economic development. Meanwhile, wealthy regions tended to be the 
most successful: Moscow City, St. Petersburg, the Khanty-Mansiysk 
and Yamalo-Nenetskiy Autonomous Okrugs, and Moscow and Sakhalin 
Oblasts all satisfied 2 of 6 economic criteria, as did the City of Sevastopol, 
which benefitted from significant aid from the federal government. But it 
is clear that the actual degree of implementation of economic criteria was 
exceedingly low. 
The ratings for social criteria, which were more dependent on the 
actions of the regional authorities, were significantly better. For example, 
the regions had success at implementing the policy that called for a wage 
increase for workers in the budgetary sphere (education, healthcare, 
culture, social welfare, etc.). This was understood to be one of the key 
objectives of the May Decrees and was closely monitored by the center. 
There was also a secondary objective here, namely fostering the loyalty of 
state employees, who are seen as an important state-dependent social group 
on which the state’s leadership relies for its electoral support. 
The leaders in implementing social criteria were the republics of 
Kabardino-Balkaria and Tatarstan, along with Nizhny Novgorod Oblast (9 
of 14 targets met). A further 8 regions—Vladimir, Lipetsk, and Moscow 
Oblasts; the republics of Ingushetia, Karachayevo-Cherkesia, North Ossetia 
and Chechnya; and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug—met 8 of the targets. 
The high positions of the republics of the North Caucasus are due primarily 
to their more traditional ways of life, low rates of illness, and high average 
life expectancy. One other example, the Republic of Dagestan, ranks 
slightly lower (7 of 14 criteria), while the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (2 of 
14) and Bryansk Oblast (3 of 14) once again find themselves at the bottom.
Let us consider the success of the regions in terms of specific indi-
cators (see Table 1).
As a whole, performance on social indicators was better than perfor-
mance on economic ones. The following indicators turned out to be the 
most difficult for the regions to achieve:
• “Increase in real wages earned by a factor of 1.4.” Not a single 
region achieved this goal.
• “Rise in wages for doctors to equal 200% of average wages in 
the region.” Only Kurgan Oblast, with its low average wage, met 
this goal.
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Table 1. Results of the fulfillment of the criteria of the May Decrees 
by the regions












Increase in real wages earned by a factor of 1.4 0 85
Rise in wages for doctors to equal 200% of 
average wages within the region
1 84
Rise in wages for teachers (general school 
education) to equal average wages within the 
region
81 4
Rise in wages for teachers (preschool) to equal 
average wages within the region for general 
school education
64 21
Rise in wages for teachers (secondary voca-
tional education) to equal average wages within 
the region
46 39
Rise in wages for cultural workers to equal 
average wages within the region
6 79
Rise in wages for teachers (higher education) to 
equal 200% of average wages within the region
4 74
Rise in wages for research personnel to equal 
200% of average wages within the region
13 70
Rise in life expectancy to 74 years of age 7 78
Decrease in mortality due to cardiovascular 
diseases to 649.4 cases per 100,000 population
56 29
Decrease in mortality due to neoplasms (includ-
ing malignant neoplasms) to 192.8 cases per 
100,000 population
36 49
Decrease in mortality due to tuberculosis to 
11.8 cases per 100,000 population
73 12
Decrease in mortality from transport accidents 
to 10.6 cases per 100,000 population
34 51
39 The results are presented as of the end of 2017; results are not available for some regions.
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Rise in investment by no less than 27% by 2018 24 61
Rise in share of GDP represented by high-tech 
and science-based sectors of the economy to 
1.3 times its level in 2011
2 83
Rise in labor productivity by 2018 to 1.5 times 
its level in 2011
0 85
Rise in number of highly qualified workers 
such that it comprises no less than a third of all 
qualified workers by 2020
12 73
Rise in the share of employed citizens between 
25 and 65 years of age who have gained further 
qualifications or professional training by 37% 
by 2015
3 82
Rise in domestic funding for research and 
development to 1.77% of GDP by 2015
5 80
Rise in the share of people using digital access 
to state and municipal services to 70% by 2018
13 72
Source: Compiled by the authors on the basis of research.
• “Rise in wages for teachers (higher education) to equal 200% of 
average wages in the region.” Just 4 regions reached this goal: 
Vladimir Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tatarstan, and Chuvashia.
• “Rise in wages for cultural workers to equal average wages 
within the region.” 6 regions met this goal: three federal cities 
(Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sevastopol), as well as Vladimir 
and Sverdlovsk Oblasts, and Primorsky Krai.
• “Rise in life expectancy to 74 years of age.” This goal was met 
mainly by the regions of the North Caucasus, which are charac-
terized by a longer life expectancy due to cultural characteristics. 
These are Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North 
Ossetia, and Chechnya, as well as the mostly Russian-speaking 
Stavropol Territory; Tatarstan also met this criterion.
The following indicators, meanwhile, were the most feasible for the 
regions: 
• “Rise in wages for teachers (general school education) to equal 
average wages within the region” (81 region); only Tula and 
Kemerovo Oblasts, Zabaykalsky and Altai Territories did not 
Subnational State Capacity in Russia 13
achieve this goal.
• “Decrease in child mortality to 7.5 cases per 1,000 live births” 
(77 regions)
• “Decrease in mortality due to tuberculosis to 11.8 cases per 
100,000 population” (73 regions)
• “Rise in wages for teachers (preschool) to equal average wages in 
the region for general school education” (64 regions).
The results of the remaining indicators differ, with between 13 and 
56 regions successfully fulfilling the social criteria (see Table 1).
Performance on economic targets was less successful. Only 24 
regions managed to achieve a “rise in investment by no less than 27% by 
2018.” Just 12 regions achieved a “rise in the number of highly qualified 
workers such that it comprises no less than a third of all qualified workers 
by 2020.” The remaining economic criteria appear to have been difficult 
for almost all regions to implement:
• No region was able to achieve a “rise in labor productivity by 
2018 to 1.5 times its level in 2011”
• Only two regions—the Republic of Mariy El and Sakhalin 
Oblast—achieved a “rise in the share of GDP represented by 
high-tech and science-based sectors of the economy to 1.3 times 
its level in 2011”
• Three regions—Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, Omsk and 
Sverdlovsk Oblasts—achieved a “rise in the share of employed 
citizens between 25 and 65 years of age who have gained further 
qualifications or professional training by 37% by 2015.” 
• Five regions—the two federal cities (Moscow and St. Petersburg), 
Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, and Ulyanovsk Oblasts—succeeded 
in increasing “domestic funding for research and development to 
1.77% of the GDP by 2015.” 
Finally, only 13 regions successfully met the special criterion “Rise 
in the share of people using digital access to state and municipal services 
to 70% by 2018.”
Thus, for most regions, most of the May Decrees turned out to 
be impracticable. This may be due to the overambitious and unrealistic 
expectations of the federal center, as well as the lack of adjustments to the 
decrees after the economic downturn in 2014.
The results of our study demonstrate that the lists of successful and 
unsuccessful regions are heterogeneous, which leads us naturally to search 
for the causes of such regional variations. In Russia, where clientelism 
and patronage are pervasive, we would argue that the role of agency is 
especially important and that the patronage ties of regional leaders—rather 
than their professional experience, awareness of local issues, and other 
factors—are significant for the successful implementation of the May 
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Decrees. To test this, we elaborated a number of hypotheses concerning the 
influence of governors’ personal characteristics on the implementation of 
the May Decrees. We employed the following indicators to express these 
characteristics (independent variables):
• The governor’s public image, operationalized as experience of 
participating in previous competitive elections;40
• Awareness of local problems, operationalized as the governor’s 
territorial origins (belonging to the local elite); 41 
• Professional experience in the federal government as a possible 
precondition for governor’s knowledge of federal policies and 
requirements.
In addition to analyzing the personal characteristics of the governors, 
we carried out a study of the influence of the region’s internal and exter-
nal connecting structures (networks), which were shown to be important 
factors in China. We operationalized the relationships with the center using 
two variables: the rating of the governors’ influence at the federal level 
(a monthly expert rating by the NGO Agency of Political and Economic 
Communications, APEC, from which we used the governor capacity 
ranking as of December 201742) and experience of work in federal execu-
tive bodies. We employed two further criteria to examine the cohesion of 
power within the regions: the operation of an internal vertical of power (as 
demonstrated by the presence or absence of direct elections of the heads of 
municipalities within the region) and the governor’s administrative experi-
ence (the number of years for which the governor had held office without 
interruption as of the end of 2017). We based the latter criterion on the 
fact that prolonged governing experience can promote the consolidation 
of the elite, which is in line with the system of patron-client relationships 
and formation of personalist regimes that is typical for Russia. It can be 
argued that the relationship is inverse and governors who successfully 
meet economic goals will stay in office longer. However, it is important 
to emphasize that the May Decrees cover only a short period of time (5 
years) and this is the duration of one governor’s term. If the governor had 
been in office for more than 5 years by 2017, this was not related to their 
40 In Russia, the Kremlin periodically appointed federal officials or staff of state administra-
tions, who had no previous experience of participation in public politics, as governors. We 
did not count a governor’s presence on United Russia’s party lists in proportional system 
elections (as opposed to single-member district elections) as electoral experience, since this 
does not demand public activity or political competition. 
41 There is a widespread Russian practice of appointing so-called “outsider” governors (or 
“varyags”) who have no prior relationship to the regions as a whole or previously worked in 
other regions. This practice has been understood as an attempt to create a class of governors 
fully loyal to the Kremlin. 
42 The APEC rating is based on the results of expert polls, which are carried out via closed 
questionnaires. The final rating is a consolidated assessment of the influence of all heads of 
Russian regions by the leaders of the Russian expert community.
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performance in fulfilling the May Decrees. 
Since the early 2000s, the federal center has adhered to a policy 
of political and economic centralization. While we are witnessing the 
indisputable success of political centralization in the regions, the results 
of the execution of the May Decrees indicate that the center is not able to 
ensure centralization in the implementation of socio-economic decisions 
at the regional level. To test whether the success of political centralization 
affects the success of the implementation of the May Decrees, we included 
a variable in the model reflecting the share of United Russia deputies in 
the region’s legislative assembly at the end of 2017.
Since the study’s primary hypothesis entails identifying the agency 
factors connected to the governors’ personal characteristics and political 
connections, we treated indicators of the institutional environment as a 
control variable. In the absence of other reliable statistics, we used the 
number of economic crimes per capita as an indirect indicator of the quality 
of the institutional environment within the regions. We also used the 
following control variables that are commonly found in Russian regional 
studies: a region’s overall level of economic development (GRP per capita) 
and the share of the population comprised by ethnic Russians. 
In order to evaluate the influence of these indicators on the depen-
dent variable—the implementation of the May Decrees—we conducted 
regression analysis using the OLS model. 
The results of the regression analysis indicate that only two variables 
were significant across all 5 models: the length of time the governors were 
in office and the ratings of their influence at the federal level. Both had a 
positive influence on the implementation of the May Decrees within the 
regions. 
Thus, we can conclude that one of the key factors that influences 
the effectiveness with which federal decisions are implemented across 
the state is the governor’s experience in office. Thus, for example, in 
Lipetsk Oblast, which is one of the most successful regions in our study, 
the governor, Oleg Korolev, had spent 19 years in office as of 2017. The 
same is true of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast, where Valery Shantsev had 
served for 12 years. Overall, among the regions that were in the lead in 
terms of implementing the May Decrees, none had governors that had 
been in office for less than five years as of the end of 2017; thus, they 
were all in power before the decrees were issued. In our opinion, the 
length of a governor’s term in office has a direct impact on the cohesion 
of regional elites. In the course of their terms in office, governors work 
constantly to strengthen their patron-client ties while suppressing rival 
groups. As the regional elite becomes more consolidated, it also becomes 
more capable of implementing decisions coming from above. At the 
same time, the growing administrative experience of the governor has 
a positive impact on the region’s ability to implement central directives. 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.
a Number of complete, uninterrupted years in office (including as acting 
governor) as of December 31, 2017 (if the governor entered office in the 
second half of 2017, the previous governor’s characteristics were used).
b Rating for December 2017; if the governor left office earlier, we used the 
data for their last month of office. See Reiting vliianiia glav sub’ektov RF. 
Rossiiskie regiony i regional’naia politika v dekabre 2017 goda [Rating 
of the Influence of the Heads of Subjects of the Russian Federation. 
Russian Regions and Regional Policies in December 2017], At http://
www.apecom.ru/projects/item.php?SECTION_ID=101&ELEMENT_
ID=4372&sphrase_id=10129, accessed March 27, 2020.
c 2 points for a member of the local elite; 1 point for a member of the local 
elite who worked in the federal center prior to appointment; 0 points for an 
external appointee with no prior experience of work in the region.
d Experience of work in executive bodies of federal government: 1—
present, 0—absent.
e Presence of direct elections of municipal heads in the region: 2—
completely absent, 1—partially present, 0—universal.
f Federal’naia sluzhba gosudarstvennoi statistiki (Rosstat) [Russian State 
Statistics Service (Rosstat)], At https://www.gks.ru/regional_statistics, 
accessed March 27, 2020.
g Pravovoi portal General’noi Prokuratury RF [Legal Portal of the General 
Procuracy of the Russian Federation], At http://crimestat.ru/offenses_rate, 
accessed March 27, 2020.
h Serossiiskaya perepis’ naseleniia 2010 [All-Russian Population Census 
2010], At https://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/
perepis_itogi1612.htm, accessed March 27, 2020.
Our study further confirmed the positive significance of the gover-
nors’ ties to the center. These connections allowed governors to gain a 
better understanding of the center’s demands and to receive informal 
instructions as to how policies should be implemented. Governors’ previ-
ous experience working in the federal government, meanwhile, did not 
appear to be significant. We do not believe this to be contradictory, as 
the practice of parachuting in “outsiders” with experience of work in the 
federal authorities carries the risk of undermining the internal cohesion 
of the regional elites. New gubernatorial appointments are typically 
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accompanied by the replacement of lower-level officials in the regional 
administrations, often leading to conflicts between the new governors and 
the local elites.43 Thus, the Russian case is in line with Jaros’ conclusions 
in his study of subnational state capacity in China that “the ability of the 
regions to use the capabilities and resources of the central government 
depends on informal ties between the authorities and the highest political 
elites.”44  
As expected, gross regional product per capita was particularly 
significant among the control variables, as demonstrated by the higher 
level of decree implementation in the wealthy regions. This prevents us 
from asserting that agency, as determined by the personalities of the gover-
nors, is the sole influencing factor. The presence of economic resources 
within the region also had a positive influence, as many of the economic 
requirements of the May Decrees were only within reach of the most 
prosperous regions. 
A less expected discovery was the influence of the share of the 
ethnic Russian population within a region, which had a stable statistically 
significant negative effect, implying that non-Russian ethnic republics 
were more successful in reaching the target criteria. On the one hand, as 
mentioned, this relates to the demographic features of national republics, 
such as higher life expectancy and lower mortality rates than those to be 
found in the industrial regions. On the other hand, there has been a radical 
shift in relations between republics and the center since Putin came to 
power, and we no longer witness the battles between the regions and the 
center that were common occurrences in the early 1990s. It is emblematic 
of this change that Tatarstan—which, alongside Chechnya, was the repub-
lic keenest to attain political autonomy—was the region most successful 
in implementing the May Decrees. Thus, loyal fulfilment of the center’s 
policies has become the new paradigm for the leaders of the ethnic repub-
lics, due to both the dependence of the poorer republics on the federal 
government and the desire of the wealthier republics to preserve some of 
their privileges in return for loyalty.
The indicator for the institutional environment—the number of 
economic crimes per capita (model 5)—had an unexpectedly positive 
influence on the implementation of the decrees. In the context of the wide-
spread lack of meritocracy in the formation of the regional power elite, the 
implementation of federal policies takes place within the framework of 
existing patron-client relations and the limited administrative capacity of 
the state. But we cannot claim that “bad” institutions in these conditions 
43 A. Kynev. 2019. “Fenomen gubernatorov—“varyagov” kak indikator retsentralizatsii (Opyt 
1991-2018)” [The Phenomenon of “Varangian” Governors as an Indicator of Recentralization 
(Experience of 1991-2018).” Politiya 2: 125-150.
44 Jaros, “Rethinking Subnational Government Capacity in China,” 652.
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systematically produce “good” results, as the conclusions were obtained 
on the basis of only one statistical indicator.
Finally, our study did not confirm the importance of the governor’s 
personal characteristics, such as their territorial origins or electoral expe-
rience. In addition, the cohesion of state and municipal powers within a 
region and the degree of United Russia’s dominance in a regional legisla-
ture were not shown to be significant. 
Discussion 
Our study of the implementation of the 2012 presidential May Decrees 
allowed us to identify a number of important factors. First, there is simul-
taneous influence from both agency factors and the economic resources 
at a region’s disposal. Since the center’s policies involved achieving a set 
of socio-economic targets, it is intuitive that the wealthiest regions would 
have the most potential, and the study confirmed this. At the same time, our 
study confirms the significance of connecting structures (networks), both 
external (a governor’s influence with the center) and internal (the cohesion 
of the regional elite resulting from a governor’s long tenure in office); it 
also demonstrates that the quality of subnational state capacity largely 
depends on the regions’ relations with the top federal-level political elites. 
Croissant and Hellmann stress that administrative capacity “is a 
scalar concept, indicating the degree to which state agencies are governed 
by meritocratic recruitment and formally institutionalized rules, rather 
than by forms of particularism such as corruption, clientelism, nepotism, 
cronyism, or patronage.”45 In Russia, informal politics and networks of 
personal relations—what Hale46 terms patronal politics—are pervasive, 
and such practices have undoubtedly weakened the state’s subnational 
administrative capacity. 
We should also stress that the regions with the best results were by no 
means those with the highest levels of civic activity, political competitive-
ness, etc. Essentially, in Russia, “bad” institutions can sometimes achieve 
relatively “good” results, determined by factors such as a region’s resource 
level and the administrative competence and influence of its governor. 
Finally, our study has shown wide variations in levels of state capacity 
across Russia, confirming that the country’s social, cultural, and political 
diversity make it impossible for the regime to achieve universal success 
in implementing its federal policies even under Putin’s rigid centralization 
of power. 
45 Croissant and Hellman, 9.
46 Hale, “Russian Patronal Politics Beyond Putin.”
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Conclusion
The conclusions drawn in our study must be worrying for the Putin regime, 
the legitimacy of which has primarily been based on “delivering the 
goods”—that is, providing Russian citizens with greater levels of economic 
and social security. The regime is currently working to implement a new 
round of decrees that were adopted when Putin won the presidential elec-
tion in 2018 and are due to be finalized by the time of the next presidential 
election in 2024. The new decrees once again promise to deliver economic 
growth and major investments in social services. However, the factors that 
prevented the implementation of the 2012 decrees are still in place, and it 
is most likely that the 2018 decrees will meet the same fate, further under-
mining support for the regime, which has fallen in recent years in parallel 
with the drop in living standards. 
Our conclusions also throw new light on the powers of the Kremlin 
and its ability to exercise control over the regions. Putin’s centralization 
drive, may have weakened the formal powers of the regions and under-
mined the key principles of federalism (Ross 2005, 2010). However, the 
Kremlin has been unable to reign in the informal powers of bureaucratic 
and regional elites, who have been able to mold and adapt federal policies 
to serve their vested interests. 
The results of our study can be generalized to allow us to make 
assumptions about the functioning of administrative capacity in other 
authoritarian states, since we observe that the state’s ability to ensure 
political centralization does not necessarily allow it to successfully pursue 
a unified policy across its regions. This calls to mind work on “bad enough 
governance:” current research on post-Soviet countries suggests that an 
autocrat may not have an incentive to improve institutions that could make 
his monopoly vulnerable.47 Future research can also be developed in this 
direction.
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